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In this paper I survey the recent economics of education literature in order to identify which 
education policies can effectively improve the quality of primary schooling, as measured by 
pupil test-based achievements. Particular attention is devoted to the experience of England, 
a country which has made substantial investments over the past decade aimed at improving 
its primary education. Evidence suggests that broadly scoped resource-based programmes 
deliver less than more targeted policies. Additionally, a growing body of research shows that 
interventions that enhance choice and competition among education-service providers, and 
motivate teachers through pecuniary rewards, have some scope in raising education 
standards. I conclude my survey by discussing some broad concerns with modes of 
education provision centred on choice and competition, mainly pupil segregation along the 
lines of ability and family background. 
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1. Introduction 
Schooling and education are central to policy debates in both developed and developing 
countries, and there are several reasons why human capital has become so prominent in both 
economic and political discussions. First, it is well recognised that education is one of the ‘best 
investments’ individuals can undertake. This claim is backed by an extensive literature on the 
private monetary returns to education, started by the seminal writings of Mincer (1974) and 
showing that schooling significantly raises individuals’ income and overall labour market 
prospects (see Card, 1999 for a review). Additionally, education is associated with other non-
monetary individual benefits, such as better physical and mental health, lower involvement in 
crime and illicit activities, and longer life expectations (see among others Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2004; Chevalier and Feinstein, 2006; Grossman, 2005; and Lochner and Moretti, 2004). 
Finally, the macro-economic literature has highlighted the importance of human-capital 
accumulation for the growth and development of a nation (see Barro, 1991; Krueger and Lindahl, 
2001; and Van Reenen and Sianesi, 2003). 
  The prime focus of this paper will be on primary schooling in developed countries. While 
the case for improving the early stages of education in developing nations is an easy one to make 
(there is still a widespread lack of primary education coverage), it may seem far less obvious that 
much still needs to be done in order to improve primary education in developed countries, and 
that this matters for both individuals’ life-long learning and the economic development of their 
societies.  
Generally speaking, recent macro-economic evidence (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007) 
suggests that secondary and tertiary education are not the only forms of human capital that are 
relevant for the growth of countries. Rather, it is the interaction between higher levels of 
education and core skills, crystallised at the earliest stages of education, that plays a prominent 
role in improving one country’s economic prospects. To complement these arguments, there is 
abundant micro-economic evidence that core skills, such as literacy and numeracy, are best learnt 3
during the primary stages of education, and that there are very high returns in the labour market 
to these basic forms of expertise (Denny et al., 2003; Machin and McNally, 2004; and Mercenaro 
et al., 2007). Recent micro-based research also shows that early educational attainments are 
crucial determinants of future education outcomes, including the probability of dropping out of 
school and enrolling at university (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; and Dearden et al., 2004), and 
that interventions that target the earliest stages of education are in a better position to 
counterbalance the adverse effects of a poor family background and other forms of disadvantage 
on the learning of young individuals (Heckman, 2000). 
Having made the case for the importance of primary education in general, the question is 
whether there is any scope for improvement in developed countries or if the margins for 
advancement are limited by the widespread mastery of core skills. Recent OECD (2005) evidence 
suggests that a lot can still be done: while a growing number of young students in OECD 
countries decide to stay-on beyond compulsory education, a large number of individuals (in the 
same cohort, as well as in older ones) are still lacking in basic numeric and literacy skills. For 
example, post-war UK has experienced a significant expansion in post-compulsory education (i.e. 
beyond the age of 16): according to OECD (2005), in 2003 about 40% of the population in the 
typical age cohort at this education stage graduated from tertiary education. The UK government 
has recently committed to further pushing this figure above 50%. Additionally, during the past 
two decades, age-16 achievements (end of compulsory secondary education) have substantially 
improved (McNally, 2007). Nevertheless, the UK is still cursed by a long tail of poor learners 
with many young (and not-so-young) individuals possessing inadequate basic skills. Machin and 
Vignoles (2006) report that in 1995 only 78% and 83% of the 16-25 year old cohorts had Level 2 
IALS (International Adult Literacy Skills) numeric and literacy skills, respectively (where Level 
2 is the minimum level required to ‘function’ in the labour market). While the situation has 
certainly improved over the last decade, thanks to large investments in primary education, more 
can be accomplished. Indeed, the UK still ranks in the bottom half of recent PISA (Programme 4
for International Student Assessment) international core skill assessments, measuring proficiency 
in mathematics, reading, science and problem solving (OCED, 2005). In a nutshell, this 
discussion suggests that, even for developed nations, there are still wide margins for enhancing 
individuals’ core skills by improving the quality of primary schooling, and that this will be 
beneficial both to individuals, by boosting their future learning and labour market prospects, and 
their countries, by raising their productivity and the ‘speed-limit’ of economic growth.  
In this paper I will review the most recent literature in the economics of education field in 
order to identify which policy interventions can effectively improve the quality of primary 
schooling, as measured by pupil test-based achievements. In doing so, I will mainly survey 
studies that focus on the earliest stages of education; however, for completeness or lack of 
alternatives, I will sometimes use evidence from research that focuses on secondary schooling. 
Additionally, I will concentrate on research that is ‘methodologically sound’, i.e. aimed at 
establishing causal relations between policy interventions and educational outcomes. Finally, 
particular attention will be devoted to the experience of England, a country which has made 
substantial investments over the past decade in order to improve its primary school system. 
England is also an ideal ‘laboratory’ since it has a long established tradition of administrative 
data collection and policy evaluation, which makes a rigorous assessment of educational 
interventions feasible.  
In the first part of this research, I will review the evidence on the effectiveness of 
resource-based interventions, in particular policies aimed at reducing class-size and promoting 
the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in schools. The latter have been 
championed by governments around the world as a way of modernising schools and teaching 
methods. A few remarkable examples include the United States, where major subsidies for 
internet and communications technologies were distributed to schools from 1998; Israel, which 
equipped most of its schools with computers starting from 1994; and the UK, where, starting 
from 2001, the government has emphasised the role of ICT investment in schools as “crucial to 5
our drive to raise standards” (Ruth Kelly, former secretary of state for education, speech to 
BETT, British Education Training and Technology, London 2005). To preview my conclusions, I 
find little evidence to support the overall effectiveness of broadly scoped resource-based 
interventions, although targeted programmes seem to deliver more in terms of pupil 
achievements. 
Partly motivated by the inconclusive evidence on the general effectiveness of resource-
based interventions, governments in many countries now favour market-oriented policies based 
on accountability, incentives and choice in education. Thus I will devote the second and longest 
part of this research to discussing the theoretical underpinnings of this debate and the related 
empirical findings. The evidence suggests that policies aimed at enhancing choice and 
competition among education-service providers and motivating teachers via pecuniary incentives 
have some scope in improving education standards. However, this might come at the cost of 
increased segregation of students along the lines of ability and family background. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I review the literature on 
resource-based interventions. In Section 3, I present the theoretical arguments and the evidence 
on the benefits of accountability, choice and competition in education. In Section 4, I briefly 
discuss a related topic, namely the role of religious and private schooling. Section 5 reviews some 
of the concerns with modes of school provision centred on parental choice, such as teaching-to-
the-test and pupil segregation. Finally, Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Resource-based Intervention: A Failure? 
Does ‘money’ matter?  
Questions about the importance of resources have long animated the debate among economists in 
a variety of fields within the discipline. For example, scholars interested in entrepreneurship have 
long discussed whether lack of resources hinders business start-up and performance 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). Researchers interested in the determinants of happiness and 6
life-satisfaction have equally studied the link between income, pecuniary resources and individual 
well-being (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; and Frjiters et al., 2004). Similarly, economists in 
the field of education have heatedly debated about the importance of resources in schools and 
about the effectiveness of resource-based interventions. The apex of this academic argument is 
well epitomised in the Economic Journal Features issue of February 2003, where two eminent 
experts of the field, namely Eric Hanushek and Alan Krueger, present their contrasting views on 
the point (Hanushek, 2003; and Krueger, 2003) 
The idea that ‘money’ (resources) matters in schools is partly rooted in a logical parallel 
between the production function of firms used in standard micro-economic theory and a human 
capital production function applied to education: in an overly simplified view, labour inputs 
(teachers’ time and teacher numbers), along with capital inputs used during classes (pens, tables, 
computers, etc), mechanically (but potentially with decreasing marginal returns) contribute to the 
production of educational attainments. Thus resources ‘fed into’ schools will be used to buy 
capital and labour inputs, and improve human capital formation. 
Broadly defined resource-based programmes include a variety of policies such as 
interventions aimed at increasing general expenditure per pupil, extra-funding for administrative 
support and other facilities, investments in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), 
increments of teacher salaries, and reduction of the class size, i.e. improvements in the pupil-to-
teacher ratio. In fact, this last ‘experiment’ is the one which has received most of the attention in 
the debate on the use of resources in schools. One of the first studies on the topic, Angrist and 
Lavy (1999), uses discontinuities created by historical maximum class size rules in Israel 
(Maiamonides’ Rule) to assess the causal impact of class size on pupil attainments. The authors’ 
estimates show that reducing class size induces a significant increase in test scores for older 
students (their fourth and fifth graders, age 9/10), but this is not true for younger pupils (third 
graders, age 8). Their methodology, exploiting identification based on maximum class size rules, 
has been replicated for several countries, including France (Piketty and Valdenaire, 2006), 7
Norway (Leuven et al., 2006) and Denmark (Browning and Heinessen, 2007), with similarly 
mixed and discouraging findings. 
In fact, Hanushek (2003) and Webbink (2005) survey a variety of studies to conclude that 
the international evidence provides little support for the general effectiveness of resource-based 
policies, and in particular interventions aimed at reducing the number of pupils in the class-room. 
To similar conclusions come Dearden et al. (2002) and Levacic and Vignoles (2002), who 
specifically address the issue of school resources, class size and educational outcomes in 
England. On the other hand, Krueger (2003) uses the STAR experiment, which nearly halved 
class size (from 22 to 12, on average) for young pupils in primary schools in very disadvantaged 
US communities, to show that aggressive and properly targeted ‘experiments’ aimed at reducing 
class size have significantly positive effects on the learning of students during early education 
years (though, admittedly, this advantage fades away at later school phases).  
A more recent but similarly controversial example of the dispute surrounding the debate 
on resource-based interventions in schools regards the use of ICT as a teaching and learning 
device. Although governments around the world support the widespread use of ICT in education 
(see Introduction for some examples), economists are sceptical that computers in schools can 
really improve education standards. Once more, Angrist and Lavy (2002) were the first to try to 
establish the existence of a causal link between ICT spending in schools and pupil learning (for 
Israel). Their findings show that ‘computers in schools’ serve little purpose when the aim is to 
improve test-based achievements (across all education stages). Following their analysis, other 
studies have come to similarly discouraging conclusions: Fuchs and Woessmann (2004) using 
international data, Leuven et al. (2004) analysing Dutch evidence, and Goolsbee and Guryan 
(2005) and Rouse et al. (2004) studying the US experience, all find little compelling evidence 
that ICT spending and computers in schools are causally associated with faster rates of education 
progress. One remarkable exception is Machin et al. (2007b) who analyse the experience of 
primary schools in England between 1999 and 2003. The authors use a change in the rules 8
governing ICT funding across different school districts of England to devise an instrumental 
variable strategy and identify the causal impact of ICT expenditure on pupil outcomes. Their 
findings point to a positive and sizeable impact of ICT expenditure on primary school 
performance in English and science, though not in mathematics.  
How can one reconcile this evidence with previous studies in the field that found no 
effect? The authors argue that, in the English case, it appears to be the joint effect of large 
increases in ICT funding (above 100%, i.e. a more than doubling of ICT funding in some areas) 
coupled with a fertile and motivated teaching background, which led to positive effects of ICT 
expenditure on educational performance. Additionally, the authors provide evidence that almost 
all English schools were fully equipped with internet access for the period under analysis, and 
that investments were targeted towards more effective areas, such as software improvements and 
teacher ICT training and support. 
Overall, the discussion so far provides us with some important lessons on the 
effectiveness of resource-based interventions. First, it seems fair to conclude that ‘money’ does 
not generally matter; however, this is not equivalent to saying that it never matters or it cannot 
matter. Webbink (2005) comes to similar conclusions. Second, many of the surveyed studies 
assess the impact of ‘marginal’ changes in resources and funding. These might produce effects 
that are too small to be detected in the data. However, the STAR experiment discussed by 
Krueger (2003), which halved class size (50% reduction), and the English experience with ICT 
studied by Machin et al. (2007b), where funding for new technologies in schools doubled (100% 
increase), both show that large policy interventions can produce sizeable effects.
1 Finally, the 
results of the STAR programme also suggest that resource-based interventions might produce 
their best outcomes if they are targeted towards where there is real need. In fact, the STAR 
programme concentrated on inner-city schools, mainly enrolling pupils with ethnic minority 
                                                 
1 Importantly, while resource-based interventions may fail to produce large effects in developed countries where the 
marginal productivity of extra investment could be too small to be detected, this might not be the case in some under-
resourced, over-crowded schools in developing nations. 9
backgrounds and severe learning disadvantages. In the next section, I specifically review some 
research on the effects of targeted policies. 
 
More on Targeted Interventions 
Is there any additional evidence on the effectiveness of targeted resource-based interventions? To 
answer this question, I will draw on the recent English experience and report on two successful 
examples, namely ‘Excellence in Cities’ (EiC) and the ‘Literacy Hour’. The UK government has 
progressively moved towards policies that specifically target well-identified ‘troublesome’ 
aspects of the schooling system. Many interventions (on top of EiC and the ‘Literacy Hour’) are 
currently being piloted in some English schools, or rolled out in the most disadvantaged areas. 
These include the Education Action Zones (including both primary and secondary schools), and 
Sure Start (concentrating on pre-school years). For some of these programmes, a thorough 
evaluation still needs to be carried out; others are at too early stages for a proper assessment. 
The first programme I will discuss is ‘Excellence in Cities’, which was launched in 
September 1999 with the aim of driving up standards in schools in major English cities. Although 
the programme initially focused on secondary schools, it was expanded to include primary 
institutions. As a result, over 1,300 secondary and 3,600 primary schools have been involved in 
the programme since it began. Machin et al. (2007a) provide a thorough description of its 
implementation at the secondary school level and an examination of the effects of EiC. The 
programme was essentially a resource-based intervention targeting schools in disadvantaged 
areas. Resource allocation to participant schools within EiC was mainly based on pupil numbers 
and level of disadvantage in the Local Education Authority (LEA) of the school. Funding varied 
from £50 per pupil in the best-off secondary schools to about £140 per pupil in the most 
disadvantaged schools, with an average of about £120 per pupil per year (about 4.4% of overall 
per pupil expenditure). Machin et al. (2007a) find that the extra resources channelled via the EiC 
programme had a positive impact on school attendance and performance in mathematics (though 10
not in English). Importantly, the authors also report a marked heterogeneity in the effectiveness 
of the policy, with the greatest impact in more disadvantaged schools and on the performance of 
middle and high ability students within these schools. They conclude that additional resources 
matter for children in the poorest secondary schools, particularly when building on a solid 
education or ability background.  
Although this evidence is based on the experience of secondary schools covered by EiC, it 
provides some support for the notion that targeted resource-based interventions can produce 
positive effects on pupil learning. Unfortunately, a similarly broad and methodologically sound 
evaluation of the primary school strand of the EiC policy has not been carried out yet. However, 
an early study by Emmerson et al. (2004) reports findings that are consistent with those of 
Machin et al. (2007a): there are small but significantly positive effects on test scores at the end of 
primary school to be had from the EiC intervention. Once more, these are mainly concentrated 
among high ability pupils in the most disadvantaged schools. 
Another interesting example of targeted intervention, based both on resources and 
teaching methods, is the ‘Literacy Hour’, implemented in English primary schools since 1996. 
This programme is described by Machin and McNally (2004), who evaluate the pilot 
implementation of the programme carried out in 1996-1998. The main rationale for this 
programme is to try to alleviate the very low levels of reading and writing skills held by children 
in many English primary schools, particularly in inner cities. The aim was to raise standards of 
literacy by improving the quality of teaching through more focused instruction and effective 
classroom management. The planned cost of the National Literacy Project (NLP) was £12.5 
million over 5 years. Money was primarily used to fund local centres and literacy consultants in 
each participating Local Education Authority; however, schools also received some funding for 
teacher training and other resources. Machin and McNally (2004) estimate that for the first two 
years the ‘Literacy Hour’ cost around £25.52 per pupil per annum. The authors find larger 
increases in attainment in reading and writing during primary education for pupils exposed to the 11
‘Literacy Hour’, compared to pupils not exposed to it. Additionally, they find small positive 
effects from ‘treatment’ that persist up to age 16.
2  
In conclusion, the findings discussed so far provide some support for the arguments 
proposed in the previous section, namely that there are larger benefits to be expected from 
policies that specifically target disadvantaged groups or a lack of specific skills among pupils. 
Moreover, they show that improving primary education and strengthening individual core skills 




3. Accountability, Choice and Incentives: The Way Forward? 
The Motivations 
Partly motivated by the inconclusive evidence on the general effectiveness of resource-based 
interventions, governments in many countries now favour market-oriented policies based on 
accountability and incentives and increased choice and competition among schools. But what are 
the main ‘ingredients’ of models of education provision centred on school choice and 
accountability? There are many theoretical accounts that focus on different aspects of the issue 
(e.g. Epple and Romano, 1998; Epple, Newlon and Romano, 2002; Glennester 1991; Nechyba, 
2000, 2003); also, the arguments are often highly politicised and involve broad philosophical 
issues. However, here I will only deal with those aspects of the debate that are associated with 
potential productivity gains and improved test-based performance of schools.  
Before moving to a discussion of the workings of education systems centred on school 
choice and accountability, it is interesting to note that the shift away from an education 
production function approach has occurred somewhat in parallel with the emergence of a ‘new 
way’ of approaching labour economics, i.e. personnel economics (see Lazear, 1995). This field 
                                                 
2 Since there are gender gaps in English performance (in favour of girls), the authors also consider whether the policy 
had a differential impact by gender. They find some evidence that at age 11 boys received a greater benefit than girls. 12
puts a more explicit emphasis on economic incentives within firms and organizations, and on 
individuals’ rational economic responses to these. Among other issues, personnel economics has 
contributed to the study of team-work and the design of optimal team compensation and 
incentives. These issues have become extremely relevant in the context of the economics of 
education, where the role of pecuniary rewards for high-performing schools and teachers is 
widely debated.  
 
The Arguments 
Accountability mechanisms lie at the heart of choice-oriented modes of schooling provision. In 
these settings, pupils in schools within a country (or state) are assessed on the basis of 
standardised, comparable and centrally-handled examinations. This allows parents and policy 
makers to identify failing schools and to impose sanctions and targets, or to undertake closure and 
restructuring. Crucially, within an accountability framework, standardised tests are generally 
made publicly available via school performance tables (league tables) to all potentially interested 
‘stake-holders’, i.e. parents, practitioners and government analysts. This implies that schools are 
not only accountable to the state or local governments (usually the main fund-granting bodies), 
but more widely and directly to parents, who demand and ‘shop around’ for school quality 
(Tiebout, 1956). Overall, the ultimate scope of accountability systems is to gather and spread 
consistent and comparable information about school achievements and to allow parents and 
policy makers to monitor education progress and teaching staff performance.  
Figlio and Page (2003) and Kane and Staiger (2001, 2002) describe some of the first 
accountability systems operating in the US. More recently, Rouse et al. (2007) provide evidence 
on how accountability has substantially changed instructional practices in public schools in 
Florida. As for the English experience, Glennester (1991) and Gorard et al. (2003) provide a 
detailed account of the system set in place by the Education Reform Act of 1988, leading to the 
publication of school performance tables from 1992. While traditionally neighbourhood-based, 13
the principle of choice has been extended to a greater or lesser extent in different areas of 
England over time, and the trend has continued recently with further expansion of choice being 
advocated in the policy debate. As a result, the current state-school system in England is a hybrid 
of a community-based model and a parental-choice setting. 
Accountability alone may provide incentives for schools to improve their performance 
(Figlio and Rouse, 2005). This might occur because of ‘name-and-shame’ mechanisms, via 
disclosure of information that helps in rectifying market failures, or through specifically targeted 
interventions (Hanushek and Raymond, 2003). Additionally, accountability might raise teacher 
and pupil motivation, increase parental involvement in their child’s education and schooling, and 
improve teaching curriculum and pedagogy (Jacob, 2005). However, it is generally argued that 
accountability will produce most of its effects when coupled with mechanisms that: (1) increase 
parental choice (within the public sector, or between private and public education) and the 
competition among schools that this engenders; and (2) grant schools some ‘autonomy’ to 
restructure their governance and respond to the competitive pressures introduced by parental 
choice. LeGrand (1991, 1993), Machin and Vignoles (2005) and Burgess et al. (2006) present a 
general discussion of the English choice and competition experience. Hoxby (2004) gives a 
detailed analysis of the topic for the US. 
To better understand these arguments, it is useful to highlight some of the features that 
characterise modes of schooling provision centred on parental-choice, as opposed to alternative 
community-based systems, in which only pupils living nearby the school or within the relevant 
jurisdiction (i.e. a ‘cathment area’) are allowed in and students attend their local schools.
3 First of 
all, the guiding principle for allocating students to schools in choice-based settings should be 
parental preference, regardless of where pupils live. This should allow ‘informed’ parents to 
choose the school that best suits their preferences, for example, one that maximises pupil learning 
                                                 
3 Note that under a community-based setting, resources are meant to be used to level differences in the ‘education 
playing field’ due to the sorting (stratification) of families with different backgrounds across residential 
neighbourhoods. 14
subject to travel costs. Second, resources should follow pupils (so that pupils are valuable ‘assets’ 
for schools), and funding should be closely linked to schools’ capacity to attract students. Third, 
schools should be granted some flexibility to experiment with different teaching methods (in 
order improve pupil learning) and to specialise so that they can cater for specific needs or tastes 
(still within a national framework, where subjects and levels of achievement at various ages are 
set and monitored centrally). Schools should also be given some autonomy to manage their 
teaching body in ways that improve performance and motivation, and to use personnel practices 
that facilitate the hiring and retaining of talented instructors and managers. Fourth (and related to 
the previous point), schools should be granted some flexibility to adjust pecuniary rewards so as 
to motivate highly-effective workers. Fifth, schools should be allowed to expand in order to 
accommodate extra demand for their services and choose their ‘optimal size’ (i.e. strike the right 
balance between the cost of teaching a larger pool of students and the benefit of exploiting 
internal economies of scale). Finally, new schools should be allowed in the ‘market’ if there is 
demand for their services, while underperforming schools should be allowed to fail and close. 
Based on these principles, advocates of models of school provision centred on parental-
choice argue that the system will lead to better schooling using standard efficiency arguments 
from economic theory. These fall into two categories: those based on the better matching of pupil 
needs and school provision; and those based on market discipline incentives. The first argument 
suggests that gains arise through the efficient allocation of pupils to schools according to personal 
tastes and pedagogic needs. If schools are allowed some freedom to differentiate, then pupils can 
choose the education-service provider that offers a teaching technology that educates them at 
least as effectively as under the alternative community-based system, in which pupils can only 
attend the local designated school. More efficient ‘matching’ of pupils and schools should lead to 
higher academic achievements. The second argument is based on competition among schools 
(within the public domain, or between public and private schools) and market-type incentives. If 
parents are given freedom to choose the school that they prefer and resources follow students, 15
‘good’ schools will attract more students and more resources, and will expand; whereas ‘bad’ 
schools will loose pupil roll, shrink and eventually close. In order to remain in the market and 
keep up with their competitors, schools will have to constantly monitor and improve teaching 
practices, thus raising educational attainments. 
Notice that one important assumption is that schools are able to signal their overall quality 
to parents via test-performance, as summarised in performance tables, and that this drives 
enrolment patterns. While certainly many other aspects of school quality motivate parental choice 
of schooling, the evidence in Black (1999), Gibbons and Machin (2006), Kane, Staiger and Reigg 
(2005) on the effect of test scores on house prices suggests that average performance strongly 
influences parental residential choice in relation to school access. More recently, Gibbons and 
Silva (2008a) show that test-based measures of school quality tend to dominate parental 
perceptions of educational excellence. 
It is interesting to highlight how the terminology used to the describe school choice and 
competition is reminiscent of the jargon used in micro-economic theories of monopolistic 
competition. Parents are viewed as consumers with heterogeneous preferences, and there are 
many ‘sellers’ in the market, i.e. schools, that differentiate their services from those of their 
competitors to cater for specific demands. Crucial to these formalisations is the presence of low 
costs and no barriers to the entry and exit of producers, i.e. new schools should be allowed to 
open and poorly performing schools should be allowed to fail and exit the market. However, 
schools are not solely driven by profit motives and (unlike firms) they might not immediately 
close when underperforming, as this entails large physical and social capital losses. This implies 
that failing schools might survive for considerable time periods and enrol pupils from families 
that do not actively exercise their school choice opportunities. Competition might thus come at 
the cost of increased segregation of students along the lines of ability and family background, an 
issue to which I will return later in Section 5. 16
In defence of modes of education provision based on neighbourhood schools, it has been 
claimed that learning proceeds better in a stable environment, where teachers are not under undue 
competitive pressures and where there is lower search-based turnover, which may have 
detrimental effects on achievement (Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin, 2004; Gibbons and Telhaj, 
2007). Moreover, schools could respond to an increase in competition by reducing costly effort 
and going down-market in order to serve only those with weak preferences for school 
performance (McMillan, 2004). Finally, total pupil travel distances could be greater when pupils 
do not automatically attend their closest neighbourhood school, with consequent detrimental 
effects on achievement because of lateness or absence.  
Given these counterbalancing arguments, what does the available evidence suggest on the 
overall effects of school choice and competition on students’ attainments? In the next Section, I 
try to provide an exhaustive answer to this question.  
 
The Evidence 
During the past two decades, much has been written about the effects of school choice and 
competition on pupil achievement. In fact, over the years, various countries have adapted their 
institutional arrangements to accommodate greater freedom of choice for families and, implicitly 
or explicitly, greater competition between schools. Following different approaches, a substantial 
volume of quantitative evidence on the topic has been produced, particularly in the US context. 
The first and most common approach is to explore the effects of implicit variation in the 
level of choice available in different public (state funded) school markets (see Hoxby, 2000a and 
Rothstein, 2006, for recent examples) to derive some indicators of market competitiveness, and 
then to measure the extent to which these are associated with pupil outcomes. One critical 
empirical problem here is the definition of the choice/competition indicators: in most research, 
the ‘market’ in which a school operates is broadly defined by the admissions district in which it is 
located, whilst the level of choice/competition is based on the number of schools that appear to be 17
available to any pupil in that district. Studies adopting this approach are mixed in their findings. 
Belfield and Levin (2003) suggest that “the gains from competition are modest in scope with 
respect to realistic changes in levels of competition”, and point out that many results are 
statistically insignificant. However, Hoxby (2000a) does find that pupils perform better in 
metropolitan areas where there seem to be more school choices. Importantly, in her work, the 
author assumes that choice is exercised through Tiebout-type mechanisms, that is via residential 
choice and by ‘voting with the feet’, rather than directly via school choice conditional on place of 
residence. Recently, the validity of her instrumental variable approach and the robustness of her 
results have been contested (Rothstein, 2006). 
A second approach evaluates the effects of private schooling on public sector 
performance. More specifically this strand looks at the competitive ‘threat’ exerted by private 
schools, by measuring the effects of private education enrolment on state school performance, 
where the assumption is that private education generates competition for state schools (Hoxby, 
1994, 2004). This strategy is complicated by the possibility that the location of private schools is 
endogenous to neighbourhood status, and that such schools are likely to skim off higher-
achieving pupils from the state sector (Epple and Romano, 1998). 
Finally, another body of research evaluates the impact of policy changes that introduce 
greater choice into geographically localised education markets. Cullen et al. (2003, 2005) find 
that students randomised into choice-enhancing initiatives in Chicago experience little academic 
benefit. On the other hand, recent work by Hoxby (Hoxby and Rockoff, 2004; Hoxby, 2003) 
finds benefits from choice-increasing programmes, as do Holmes et al. (2003) from school choice 
in North Carolina, and Lavy (2005a) from choice in school districts in Tel Aviv. Unfortunately, 
these findings are often difficult to generalise, given the highly localised and peculiar settings 
under analysis.  
All in all, it is fair to say that the international and US evidence is voluminous, but mixed 
in its findings. Moreover, most research does not disentangle whether any benefits to be had from 18
modes of school provision centred on parental-choice occur because this improves the match of 
pupils with schools (i.e. a direct ‘choice effect’), or because this increases competitive pressures 
in the education market (i.e. an indirect ‘competition effect’).
 4 
Evidence for England is much more limited, and mainly focused on secondary education. 
For example, Levacic (2004) finds that secondary school head-teachers’ self-reports of perceived 
competition are linked to school performance indicators. Also, Bradley et al. (2000) show a 
number of market-type effects in secondary education following admissions reforms in the late 
1980s; for example, schools that performed better than their neighbours attracted more pupils. On 
the other hand, Clark (2005) reports that reforms that handed more power to secondary schools in 
the late 1980s only generated modest efficiency gains through competition effects.  
Gibbons et al. (2007) is the first (pupil-level) analysis focusing on the effects of choice 
and competition on academic achievement in primary schools in England. Additionally, the 
authors explicitly try to disentangle whether any benefits to be had from choice-based settings 
occur because of a direct ‘choice effect’ (i.e. better matching of pupils with education-service 
providers), or because of increased competitive pressures faced by schools. Their empirical 
findings reveal no simple (ordinary least squares) association between measures of school choice 
and achievement, but a small positive link between measures of school competition and 
performance. However, this seems to be related to endogenous pupil sorting or school location, 
since instrumental variable estimates show that there are no general benefits to be had from 
increasing school competition across the board. Nevertheless, the authors find that state-schools 
with autonomous governance and admission procedures (so called ‘Voluntary Aided’ schools) 
respond positively to a greater degree of competition with other local schools: their students’ 
value-added attainment score improves by about 1.6 point for each additional competitors. This 
corresponds to about 16-19 weeks of progress in one of the core subjects, i.e. English or 
mathematics. To justify their findings, the authors argue that the institutional arrangements in 
                                                 
4 Bayer and McMillan (2005) is the only work which conceptually distinguishes these two ideas. Yet the authors’ 
structural modelling approach only allows the estimation of the effect of school competition. 19
‘autonomous’ Voluntary Aided schools are more conducive to a focused, competitive ethos in 
which the setting of targets and monitoring of performance are seen as a way to attract pupils 
through the promise of excellence. These findings lend some support to the arguments discussed 
above, namely that increased parental choice and school competition, coupled with some degree 
of school ‘autonomy’, can lead to an improvement in standards in education.  
Note that this research paper is silent about the effects of the private sector ‘competitive 
threat’ on the performance of public-sector schools. In another recent piece, Gibbons and Silva 
(2008b) tackle this issue and find no evidence that a higher concentration of private education-
service providers improves the performance of neighbouring public-sector schools in England. 
Inside the Black-Box of Choice and Competition: The Role of Incentives and Teachers 
Why does one find (or expect to find) that the benefits of choice and competition on pupil 
outcomes are more pronounced in schools that enjoy some degree of ‘autonomy’? This is not 
because institutions such as Voluntary Aided schools in England (or private schools in the US) 
are on average better than other standard state-schools (a claim to which I will return in the next 
section). Rather, it is because the institutional arrangements of these schools make them 
potentially more responsive to the incentives that market-oriented education reforms bring about. 
To clarify this point, let us consider again the example of Voluntary Aided schools in 
England. The charity or foundation linked to the school has a ‘controlling majority’ within the 
Governing body, and therefore has a strong influence on the running of the school. Because 
Voluntary Aided schools are also directly responsible for their pupil admissions (and thus 
funding), it is more likely that strategies that promote educational excellence, such as the setting 
of targets and monitoring of performance mentioned earlier, will be used to attract pupils. 
Additionally, the charitable organisation which controls the Governing body of an ‘autonomous’ 
school is directly responsible for staff appointments, especially the hiring of teachers and head-20
teachers. As a result, these schools will most likely try to attract high-quality personnel, by 
encouraging and financially rewarding outstanding teaching practices.
5  
These remarks highlight a very crucial point: at the heart of the choice and competition 
argument lies the assumption that school governors, head-masters and teachers respond to 
market-type incentives by raising effort and teaching quality, and that carefully designed 
financial incentives will attract and stimulate teaching and managerial ‘excellence’. But what is 
the evidence about the power of market and pecuniary incentives in stimulating effort, motivation 
and teaching quality?
6  
A small, but growing body of research on the functioning of the labour market for 
teachers (and head-teachers) has been produced over the past years. Using different 
methodologies and data, Dolton and van der Klaauw (1999), Hanushek et al. (2003b, 2003c), 
Murnane and Olson (1989, 1990) all show that individuals respond to (relative) wage incentives 
in their decision to start teaching or leave the occupation. Chevalier et al. (2007) confirm this 
finding for a longer time horizon (1960s to 1990s). 
More to the point of incentives, teaching quality and pupil attainments, Hanushek et al. 
(2003b) and Lavy (2002, 2005b) show that teacher performance-related pay schemes have great 
potential for attracting effective teachers, improving their motivation and increasing pupils’ 
attainments. Clotfelter et al. (2006) report that a pecuniary bonus granted to qualified teachers in 
North Carolina greatly reduced their hazard of leaving high-poverty schools; this was especially 
pronounced for teachers with longer years of experience, usually associated with better pupil 
outcomes (Hanushek et al., 2005). Along similar lines, Lazear (2003) argues that teacher pay 
                                                 
5 On the other hand, in other school types in England, there is often a greater need to balance the objective of high 
standards for high-achievers with appropriate education for children from diverse backgrounds, including those with 
English as an additional language and those with special educational needs. Additionally, numbers in 
undersubscribed non-autonomous schools, such as Community schools for which the Local Authority handles 
admissions centrally, are often topped up with pupils who could not be accommodated in their school of choice. This 
undoubtedly weakens the potential link between parental choice and school competition. 
6 An even more fundamental question relates to how we should measure teachers’ quality. Hanushek et al. (2005) 
show that there is substantial variation in the quality of instruction and that most of this heterogeneity occurs within 
(rather than between) schools. The authors also show that teacher quality appears to be unrelated to advanced degrees 
or certification. On the other hand, experience matters and crucially so in the first years in the profession. 21
compression in the US and Sweden has resulted in some adverse selection, with the highest 
quality teachers leaving the profession; the author further suggests that linking compensation to 
performance would result in improved teacher quality and school effectiveness. Recently, Besley 
and Machin (2008) suggest that financial incentives work well to retain ‘good’ head-teachers in 
secondary schools in England, and that there is a significant link between school ‘success’ and 
salaries granted to school masters. Similarly, Atkinson et al. (2007) find that monetary incentives 
in English secondary schools help in improving pupil achievements in national tests. Finally, 
Hoxby (2000b) provides direct evidence that school choice affects the teaching profession by 
increasing demand for staff with higher qualifications (especially in mathematics and science), 
and by requiring teachers to exert higher levels of efforts and greater independence. 
Overall, this evidence suggests that teaching staff respond to pecuniary and market 
incentives aimed at increasing their effort and ‘output’ (i.e. learning). This establishes an 
important channel by which policies aimed at introducing competition and market-type incentives 
in the public-school sector can lead to improvements in the effectiveness of primary education.  
 
4. An Aside on the Effect of Attending an ‘Alternative’ School 
I have argued that schools that enjoy more freedom in their management practices and 
governance from central or local authorities are more likely to be responsive to market-type 
incentives induced by school competition and choice. In the US settings, these institutions are 
usually private, religiously affiliated schools; admission to these is mainly subject to paying fees, 
and a growing number of voucher programmes have been introduced to allow students from poor 
family backgrounds to opt-out of the state system and receive private education. In England, the 
setting is rather different. Only a very small share of students across all compulsory school years 
opt for private education; recent estimates put this figure at around 5-6%. However, within the 
state sector, some school types enjoy more ‘autonomy’ from the Local Education Authority than 
others. I have already described the case of Voluntary Aided school, normally religiously 22
affiliated institutions (mostly with Catholic or Church of England denominations); another 
example is the ‘Foundation school’ group, with an organisation similar to that of Voluntary 
Aided schools, but mainly not religiously affiliated.  
However, while the discussion above suggests that these schools may improve their 
effectiveness when facing a competitive environment, it does not rule out that these schools 
might be worse when set in an isolated, monopolistic environment. Similarly, the arguments 
above do not suggest that these ‘alternative’ schools are on average of better quality, i.e. that 
pupils educated in these institutions perform on average better than their peers in standard state-
schools all other things being equal (including the competitive pressures faced by the schools). 
Unfortunately, these issues are often confused in the policy debate. For example, evidence that 
pupils using vouchers to attend private schools perform better than comparable students in state-
schools is often wrongly used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of policies stimulating 
competition between public and private schools. Similarly ‘spurious’ inference is extrapolated 
from the average performance of students in Faith (state) schools in England, when in fact studies 
that compare the average performance of students across various school types are silent about the 
effects of school choice and competition.  
What evidence is available on the relative performance of different school types? One 
body of research looks at whether pupils offered vouchers for access to the private sector perform 
better relative to those in public (state) schooling. Rouse (1998) studies the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Programme, which provided vouchers to students with disadvantaged family 
backgrounds, enabling them to attend private non-religiously affiliated schools. The author finds 
that pupils selected by the programme to attend a private school performed better in mathematics, 
though not reading, compared to unsuccessful applicants. On the other hand, Mizala and 
Romaguera (2000) study a similar programme implemented in Chile, but find that pupils in 
subsidised private schools did not score better than comparable students in municipal schools. 
Similarly, Krueger and Zhu (2003) find that students randomised into a New York school 23
voucher programme did not experience significant test-score gains. Once more, it is worth 
emphasising that this approach cannot disentangle whether increased choice and competition are 
effective at raising standards, or whether schooling in the private sector offers advantages over 
state sector education. If it is the latter, then giving families more opportunity to gain entry to 
private schools (by vouchers or similar schemes) could lead to aggregate improvements in 
educational standards, but neither choice nor competition are directly responsible. 
A related strand of research studies the effect of attending a Faith school, without this being 
subsidised by vouchers, but out of parental choice. Most of the early academic work on the topic 
has focussed on private Catholic schools in the US and has shown that attendance at a religious 
school raises pupil attainments, although there is variation across different demographic groups 
and depending on the outcome considered (e.g. test-scores vs. staying-on rates). However, 
researchers in the field have had to tackle a particularly troubling issue, namely that there is 
clearly non-random sorting of pupils into Faith schools (religious school attendance is correlated 
with unobserved pupil and family characteristics that are often educationally advantageous). Most 
approaches have tried to find an explicit source of random variation in the probability of Faith 
school attendance that is otherwise uncorrelated with educational attainment, and use it as an 
instrument. The first typical approach has used family religion as an instrument, on the basis that 
being Catholic is a strong determinant of attendance at a Catholic school (Noell, 1982; Evans and 
Schwab, 1995; Neal, 1997). Another approach has used instruments that measure the local 
‘supply’ of Faith schooling and other area-demographic variables (Neal, 1997; Figlio and Stone, 
1999). However, recent evidence in Altonji et al. (2002, 2005) is not supportive of any of the 
instruments commonly used. Given the weaknesses in the IV approach, some have tried other 
methods. Jepsen (2003) uses value-added models to control for pupil background characteristics 
and finds no impact of Catholic schools on test scores. Altonji et al. (2005) infer the degree of 
selection bias in the Catholic school effect from the extent of selection on observable pupil 
characteristics, and conclude that there is little evidence of an influence on test-scores.  24
For England, evidence on the performance benefits of Faith schools is fairly limited and 
mainly restricted to secondary education. Schagen et al. (2002) show that pupils in Faith 
secondary schools progress slightly faster in English, but not in mathematics and science. Benton 
et al. (2003) report that Faith secondary schools are associated with faster grade progression 
between age 11 and 13, and age 13 and 16, but this is confined to schools affiliated with non-
mainstream Christian (i.e. not Catholic or Church of England) and Jewish denominations. 
However, neither of these studies take any steps to control for pupil background or otherwise deal 
with selection on unobservable characteristics that influence educational progress. 
In a recent piece, Gibbons and Silva (2006b) study the effect of attending a Faith school 
on educational attainment progress during primary education in England. Their approach exploits 
access to information about pupils’ place of residence, previous academic records and future 
(secondary) school choice to control carefully for factors that influence the propensity to attend 
Faith schools. Their results suggest that although Faith schools – especially the ‘autonomous’ 
Voluntary Aided state-schools mentioned above – tend to admit pupils with educationally 
advantageous backgrounds, there are no clear performance benefits that cannot be attributed to 
the sorting/selection of pupils likely to show the fastest progress into these schools. These 
findings reinforce the point made at the beginning of this section: comparing the average 
performance of students across various school types is not informative about the effects of school 
choice and competition. Indeed, in the English school setting, one finds that ‘autonomous’ 
schools tend to respond to market-type incentives by improving the performance of their pupils, 
although on average they do not perform better than other schools.
7  
 
5. Some Broad Concerns with Accountability, School Choice and Competition 
An analysis of school accountability, choice and competition would not be complete without a 
discussion of some of their drawbacks. Some of the criticisms belong to the ‘school 
                                                 
7 This suggests that there is a tail of ‘autonomous’ schools in areas protected from competition who behave like 
‘monopolists’ and that have on average worse performance that other school types. 25
effectiveness’ domain; some, instead, revolve around distributional issues, mainly the segregation 
of pupils with different abilities and backgrounds into different schools. Although this paper 
mainly deals with efficiency in the provision of primary education, I will discuss some 
distributional concerns as they are prominent in the debate about the drawbacks of market-
oriented reforms in education. 
  First, and in relation to the efficiency of learning, it has been argued that the publication 
of performance tables that summarise pupil and school performance into one single, well 
identified figure (say, age-11 school average SATS) has pushed teachers to focus on training 
students only to perform well in standardised and pre-identified tests, while penalising more 
broadly-scoped individualised learning. This problem is often referred to as teaching-to-the-test, 
and some evidence on its prevalence is discussed in Jacob (2005) and Lazear (2007). It is 
however worth emphasising that, during the primary stages of education, when learning 
concentrates on basic skills, teaching-to-the-test might be a lesser concern because there is less 
room for personalised learning and choice than at the secondary level. Additionally, Lazear 
(2007) analyses conditions under which high-stakes standardised testing, where pupils are 
assessed and rewarded for passing well-defined exams, maximises student learning. The author 
shows that standardised tests should be used when: (1) there are disproportionately many high-
cost learners in the class (or school); and (2) monitoring of learning is very costly. The author 
argues that this situation is more likely to occur during primary education, in particular because 
young pupils are more difficult to educate (the marginal cost of learning is decreasing in the 
accumulation of general human capital) and to assess. Thus high-stakes predictable tests could be 
efficiency enhancing in primary education. 
  A related worry is that schools and teachers might try to ‘game the system’ or ‘coach’ 
only students that are most likely to perform well in standardised tests (or to achieve a given 
‘threshold’ reported in league tables) in order maximise school ratings. Indeed, Cullen and 
Redback (2006) find that schools exempt more poor-performing students from sitting their exams 26
when facing short-run incentives to improve performance. Similarly, Figlio and Getzler (2006) 
document that schools placed significantly more students from low socio-economic backgrounds 
into special education needs after the introduction of accountability mechanisms in Florida. As 
for England, Burgess et al. (2005) finds evidence consistent with the idea that accountability has 
diverted teachers’ attention away from low ability pupils towards students most likely to achieve 
high marks and thus improve school rankings. 
  Another intriguing concern about accountability and choice has been brought forward by 
Kane and Staiger (2001, 2002). The authors argue that the volatility of average school test scores, 
which are at the heart of accountability systems, has not been fully appreciated by economists. In 
fact, there are two sources of ‘imprecision’ in measuring school quality on the basis of yearly 
standardised performance tables. One is idiosyncratic and related to one-time factors that may 
affect performance at a given school, in a given year, on the day of the test (the authors report the 
example of a dog barking in a nearby field). The second source is related to the year-to-year 
variation in the composition of pupils in a school, which affects test performance, but provides 
little information about the ‘real’ school effectiveness. This latter problem is more serious for 
primary schools than for secondaries, because of their relatively small size: the amount of 
variation due to idiosyncratic differences in the characteristics of pupils will be large relative to 
the total test-score variation between schools, making statements about relative quality and rank 
unreliable. These issues pose serious threats to accountability systems and school choice in 
general: pupil performance is used to reward, sanction and design incentives for teachers and 
other personnel; average performance is used by local and central governments to identify best 
practices and target interventions; performance table results are used by parents to assess school 
quality and inform their choice. The authors suggest that, when assessing one school’s overall 
quality, more reliable indicators should be obtained by pooling together data over several years 
and across various outcomes. 27
However, the most overarching concern about school choice is that even if choice itself, 
or the competition it engenders, has the potential to boost pupil achievements, the gains may not 
be equally distributed and may come at the cost of increased segregation of pupils across schools. 
The argument is two-fold. On the one hand, better-off parents might be more effective at 
exploiting school choice and benefit from this to gain access to high-quality education, thus 
segregating students with the most disadvantaged backgrounds into ‘sink-schools’. This might 
occur because of different awareness of educational opportunities and familiarity with the 
education system, and because of travel costs (and time) involved in commuting to the school of 
choice when this is not the local institution, which might depend on family background and 
socio-economic characteristics. On the other hand, when high-stakes standardised exams are the 
focus of schools (in order to maximise reputation, roll and funding), schools might have 
incentives to cherry-pick students with the ‘right’ family background and those who are more 
promising in terms of future achievements (a practice called ‘cream-skimming’). 
What does the available evidence suggest about the link between choice and segregation? 
The international literature is divided about whether choice and competition lead to increased 
pupil polarisation. US-based research is generally speaking more focused on the efficiency 
aspects of choice and competition. However, those few papers tackling the issue have produced 
mixed findings. For example, Hoxby (2003) generally argues that school competition is a “tide to 
lift all boats” and Hoxby (2000) shows that the racial heterogeneity of one student’s peer group is 
not affected by measures of school choice. Similarly, Hoxby (2004) provides evidence that 
enhanced school choice is not associated with more cream-skimming and segregation. On the 
other hand, Urquiola (2005) suggests that district availability of schools affects both district-level 
and school-level peer composition. Moreover, Rothstein (2004) and Smith and Meier (1995) 
show that parents value peers more than effective schools, and suggest that most choice based 
policies might produce their effects via sorting. 28
In contrast, much more research effort has been directed at understanding the effects of 
competition on segregation in England, although the focus is usually on secondary schools. 
Among others, Bradley et al. (2000), Bradley and Taylor (2002), Goldstein and Noden (2003), 
and Burgess et al. (2004) all suggest that increased competition and greater parental choice are 
associated with more polarization in English secondary  schools. On the other hand, Gorard, 
Taylor and Fitz (2003) show that secondary schools became less socially segregated in the 1990s 
after the introduction of the market-oriented reforms during the late 1980s. Gibbons and Silva 
(2006a) are amongst the few to directly analyse this issue at the primary school level. The authors 
find that school competition tends to exacerbate polarisation of primary schools by student 
attainment. While not statistically significant, their estimates hint at fairly large impact of school-
market competitiveness on stratification. In conclusion, the evidence suggests that, although there 
can be performance benefits from policy that promote competition in primary schooling markets, 
this may come at the cost of increased polarisation of pupils along the lines of ability and 
attainments. 
Note, however, that when education provision follows an alternative based on 
neighbourhood-schooling, differences in community composition lead directly to disparities in 
terms of abilities and attitudes of pupils and resources at their disposal, including parental and 
social capital. Under these conditions, the outcomes of community-based systems can be highly 
inequitable since pupils in poor areas are more likely to attend schools with poor educational 
outcomes and harsh social environments, than pupils living in wealthier areas. Furthermore, 
parents who cannot exit unpopular schools via the admission system, i.e. exercising their choice, 
can exit the community by moving home, leading to what is known as stratification-by-mortgage. 
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning that, aside from distributional considerations, 
stratification by ability of pupils across schools might have implications for the efficiency of 
primary education. This would be the case if there were strong peer effects (at the class or school 
level) and if these were highly non-linear. In fact, if peer-effects were significantly concave in 29
pupil ability, more ‘mixed’ classes (or schools) would imply that, while high ability students are 
not worse off in terms of their performance when mixed with low ability students, less-able 
pupils benefit from interaction with high ability ones.
8 Unfortunately, estimating the presence, the 
size and the shape of peer effects is particularly challenging from both the empirical and 
conceptual point of view (Manski, 1993), and the literature has not come to a consensus. 
Hanushek et al. (2003a) use a fixed-effects approach to estimate the magnitude of peer effects on 
primary school test performance in the US. The authors show that the average achievement of the 
peers has a small positive impact on students’ attainments and that this effect is roughly constant 
(linear) across quartiles of the school achievement distribution. To similar conclusions comes 
Hoxby (2002), who finds that students are influenced by the performance of their peers, where 
these effects are generally linear.  
Some recent evidence for English schools is provided by Gibbons and Telhaj (2006) and 
Maurin et al. (2006). The former analyse secondary schools and document the existence of small 
(almost zero) effects of average peer achievement on pupils’ performance, finding no evidence of 
non-linearities. The latter, instead, focus on primary schools and exploit the fact that pupil month 
of birth is a strong predictor of age-11 achievements to derive an instrument for the strength of 
peer quality at the school-level. Their results suggest that peer effects in primary schools are 
significantly non-linear. However, it is difficult to disentangle whether peer influences occur 
through grades or directly via the age composition of the group in their setting.  
All in all, it is fair to conclude that peer effects appear to exert a small and mainly linear 
effect on pupils’ performance. Thus concerns that school choice and competition exacerbate pupil 
stratification along the lines of ability and background find their strongest rationale in 
distributional considerations (as opposed to efficiency) and arguments that emphasise other 
aspects of pupils’ life not captured by test scores, such as social cohesion, tolerance and respect 
for differences. 
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without clear effects on average achievement. 30
 
6. Concluding Discussion  
In this paper, I have surveyed the economics of education literature in order to identify which 
policies can effectively improve the quality of primary education. Relatively more emphasis has 
been put on the recent experience of England, a country which has made substantial investments 
over the past decade aimed at improving its primary school system.  
My main conclusions suggested that broadly scoped resource-based interventions are not 
generally and convincingly effective in raising primary education standards. This finding is 
consistent with the conclusions of Levacic and Vignoles (2002), who critically assess the link 
between school resources and student outcomes in England. Nevertheless, I have also emphasised 
that targeted investments, which address problems in specific areas (such as inner-cities), provide 
extra support for pupils with learning disadvantages, or tackle a lack of skills in clearly identified 
subjects (such as literacy), deliver visible benefits. This holds in the case of the ‘Excellence in 
Cities’ programme (Machin et al., 2007a) for example, and of the ‘Literacy Hour’ policy (Machin 
and McNally, 2004).  
In my analysis, I have also suggested that market-oriented policies that introduce some 
elements of accountability, school choice and competition in the provision of education, and 
motivate teachers using pecuniary rewards, have some scope in improving the effectiveness of 
primary education. To be fair, the evidence on the topic is still mixed. Nevertheless, a growing 
number of papers suggest that competition-type incentives, coupled with some degree of 
‘autonomy’ for schools from the local or central government, can be beneficial to the learning of 
primary school students.  
The lack of general, unequivocal evidence that school choice and competition positively 
impact on pupil attainments could be signalling that market-oriented reforms simply do not 
generally work in education. On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that market-type 
incentives are not yet pervasive and fully ‘in motion’ in many areas of the education system. For 31
example, teacher and head-teacher salaries might still be too homogeneous and not sufficiently 
geared towards rewarding excellence. Additionally, parents might have too little say in what 
schools should deliver and how they should be managed. However, the most important limitation, 
at least in the current English setting, is that policies aimed at increasing school choice have been 
unable to sever the link between residential location and school attendance. Many schools still 
prioritise applications by proximity when over-subscribed, making a choice-based system a de 
facto catchment-area based setting. This certainly limits the potential benefits of choice and 
quasi-markets in education. 
In the concluding part of this survey, I have also emphasised some important drawbacks 
of modes of school provision based on parental-choice, such as teaching-to-the-test. However, the 
most prevailing concern with choice-based settings is that, even if wider school choice boosts 
some pupils’ achievements, these benefits may come at the cost of increased between-school 
segregation and gains may not be equally distributed across society. Although Hoxby (2003) 
claims that competition is a “tide to lift all boats”, it might be too early to judge. In fact, the 
evidence I have surveyed suggests that competition among schools may be associated to 
increased segregation of pupils with different abilities and backgrounds into different schools.  
How could this be mitigated? One extreme and rather simplistic answer is to simply let 
poor-performing schools fail and close, such that there won’t be any ‘sink-schools’ into which 
pupils from poorer backgrounds can be segregated. While this solution could be efficient in the 
long-run, it might not be viable in the short run. Schools (unlike firms) do not operate solely on 
profit-motives; moreover, they cannot easily close, as this results in large physical and social 
capital losses. This implies that failing schools might survive for considerable time periods and 
continue to enrol pupils from more disadvantaged families that do not actively exercise their 
school choice options. This might further worsen the segregation of students with different 
backgrounds into different schools.  32
Advocates of choice and competition have proposed other solutions, which seem more 
practical. For example, if increased polarisation is related to a lack of parental awareness of 
education opportunities, the publication of better information about school quality and activities, 
the organisation of open-days in schools and more pervasive efforts aimed at involving parents in 
education could help in redressing the situation. Similarly, if choice is constrained by transport 
costs, the introduction of transport vouchers might help parents with the most disadvantageous 
conditions. On the other hand, if segregation is linked to schools selecting only the most 
promising students (‘cream-skimming’), financial incentives might work the best. That is, more 
resources (than under the current setting) should be attached to pupils from disadvantaged 
backgrounds and/or with learning difficulties and the portability of ‘money’ for these students 
across schools should be strengthened. This would provide direct incentives for schools to enrol 
these students, as well as set-up structures that cater for their special needs and improve their 
learning (since this would presumably show up in performance tables and contribute to the 
school’s reputation). 
  Finally, given the emphasis on schools that has dominated the recent policy debate and 
motivated this chapter, I believe it is worth concluding with a cautionary remark. Kane and 
Staiger (2002) report that for the US less than 16% of the variance of pupil achievement is 
between schools, and can therefore be roughly attributed to differences in school quality. Using 
English school census data for several cohorts, I have come to similar conclusions: at most 14% 
of the variation in pupil achievement at the end of primary education is between schools. This 
figure is very similar (16%) when using value-added measures of performance between ages of 7 
and 11 to account for some sorting of students with different abilities and backgrounds into 
different schools. On the other hand, differences in residential neighbourhoods (as measured by 
postcode ‘fixed-effects’) can account for up to 60% of the variance in pupil attainment at the end 
of primary education. Given the strong link between family resources and residential sorting, 
these differences mainly pick up disparities in family background. In fact, Kramarz et al. (2007) 33
use econometric techniques to decompose pupil attainments at the end of primary education in 
England into various ‘components’ and find that family background accounts for most of the 
variation in students’ test-score performance. Put in different terms, this evidence suggests that 
families (and neighbourhoods) play a dominant role in determining pupil educational attainments, 
whereas the role that schools have in closing educational gaps seems somewhat limited. Overall, 
it seems that the most promising education interventions would try to identify the most ‘hard-to-
reach’ students and address not only what goes on when they are at school, but more broadly 
tackle the disadvantages that these students carry with them when they come to school. 34
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